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1. Introduction 
 
Bargaining between Multinational Enterprises (MNE) and organized workforce is a subject of key 
relevance in contemporary economics. This issue has particular importance in a context like the 
European Union (EU), where the presence of MNE having productive units in different Member 
States characterizes several industries. The international dimension of MNE’ activities as well as 
the practice of opting out from national/sector collective bargaining in favor of company-wide 
agreements (Eurofound, 2009) have a deep impact on labor market outcomes, attracting the EU 
institutions and labor unions’ attention.  
In 1994, the European Commission (EC) instituted the European Works Councils (EWC) (Directive 
94/45/EC, recently revised in 2009 with the Directive 2009/38/EC)
1, a voluntary instrument to 
provide information and consultation rights for MNE’ employees in relation to transnational issues.
2 
After the implementation of the EWC Directive, the EC proposed in the Social Agenda 2006-2010 
the development of a non-compulsory EU framework for transnational bargaining. From the 
viewpoint of the EC, this normative background would offer the prospect to arrange transnational 
agreements at company level.  
Workers’ representatives, mainly labor unions, started exploiting the EWC’ potential to coordinate 
bargaining activities across different plants, setting the context for negotiations within MNE. The 
result may be an effective coordination of the bargaining agenda and outcomes among cross-
borders separate negotiations (European Commission, 2009). Given the predominant unions’ 
position in EWC, these bodies have actually a bargaining role. Latest developments in transnational 
labor unions’ practices may change the prospect as regards the bargaining processes at company-
level. For example, in the banking sector, Danish trade unions have the mandate of negotiating on 
behalf of all employees working at the multinational Danske Bank (EIROnline, 2009). In addition, 
the European Metalworking’s Federation (EMF), UNI Europa Graphical (UEG), and more recently 
the European Public Service Union (EPSU), three cross border industry level federations, devised a 
procedure to receive the mandate in representing the overall workers’ side throughout company-
wide transnational agreements. Since the EMF formulated its internal procedure, this has been 
utilized with at least five MNE (Areva, Schneider, Daimler-Chrysler, John Deere and 
ArcelorMittal)
 (Eurofound, 2009; Gennard, 2009), while the EPSU used it in negotiations with 
Suez-Lyonnais des Eaux (Papadakis, 2010).  
Transnational campaigns to support wage bargaining and wage improvements in specific industries 
or MNEs are additional means that labor unions use to move nearer to issues at the core of 
traditional collective bargaining at a transnational level. One main objective is of gaining better 
access to (and sharing) crucial bargaining information such as labor costs, the share of labor costs in 
the companies’ total costs, and company profitability which may be helpful in negotiation rounds 
(Keune and Schmidt, 2009).  
As a result, the figures related to cross border company agreements among unions are expected to 
increase constantly: according to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC, 2008), these 
raised from 92 in 2005 to 147 in 2007. Nonetheless, according to the EWC database of the 
European Trade Union Institute (ETUI, 2009), these figures relate to a subset of all MNE operating 
in the EU, representing only one sixth of the MNE where an EWC is active.  
Why have unions this variety of attitude as regards coordination of bargaining activities in MNE? 
Despite the fact that several economic sectors are dominated by the presence of MNE, especially in 
                                                 
1 Subsequently, in March 2002 the European Council and Parliament adopted the Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a 
general framework for informing and consulting employees at national level. This directive applies also to firms 
employing at least 50 employees. The rational for this norm was that many MNEs production plants were not covered 
by the previous EWC Directive.  
2 According to Article 5(1) of the Directive 94/45/EC (unchanged in the 2009 revision), an EWC may be established 
either by: 1) a central management initiative to start negotiations for an information and consultation procedure; or 2) at 
the written request of at least 100 employees or their representatives in at least two undertakings or establishments in at 
least two different Member States.   3
the EU, the greatest part of the received contributions focuses on the effects of bargaining 
coordination in national oligopoly industries, while the transnational dimension is barely explored. 
This work addresses precisely on this issue. 
There is a consistent strand of the literature paying attention to various effects and features of 
collective bargaining. Authors as Davidson (1988), Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Petrakis and Vlassis 
(2004), and more recently Santoni (2009) investigate the outcomes of different wage bargaining 
structures (centralization/decentralization) in oligopoly industries. While Davidson (1988) considers 
simultaneous bargaining in a duopoly industry with a homogeneous final good, Horn and Wolinsky 
(1988) extend the analysis to the strategic implications arising from product differentiation and 
sequential wage bargaining.
3 It turns out that, depending on the productive market structure, unions 
and firms have conflict of interests over the level of bargaining coordination. Petrakis and Vlassis 
(2004), allowing for asymmetries in firms’ productive efficiency and bargaining power, investigate 
the endogenous formation of wage bargaining institutions in an oligopoly industry with 
homogeneous products. Different degrees of coordination (full decentralization, partial 
centralization, full centralization) arise in equilibrium. Instead, Santoni (2009) analyzes how 
increasing international market integration will affect the choice related to decentralized/centralized 
negotiations at industry level. Though, these contributions concentrate on developments about 
negotiation structures in national industries, without taking into account an international dimension 
in collective bargaining. Wage formation at company level in a context of an international 
productive structure is the subject of Borghijs and Du Caju (1999). Using a very simple framework 
(a single firm having two plants in different countries), they analyze the unions’ cross borders 
cooperation opposed to plant specific wage settings. Under the assumption of monopoly unions 
(having full bargaining power), and in presence of exogenous transaction costs to cooperate, these 
authors show that transnational wage coordination is not always advantageous for organized labor. 
Starting from the basic Borghijs and Du Caju’s (1999) set up, this work extends the analysis of 
these authors in several ways. First, by relaxing the monopoly union assumption, this paper 
provides a more general bargaining framework where the parties might endogenously select the 
negotiations’ mode. Then, retaining the idea that coordination is costly for labor unions, it 
investigates which bargaining structure (transnational-coordinated/plant level-autonomous) arises as 
sub-game perfect equilibrium in negotiations among the MNE and its organized workforce. The 
game is a sequential one. First, unions decides whether to coordinate their bargaining activities. 
This is not an ad hoc assumption: in real world, it is widely observed that bargaining coordination 
activities are firstly taken by the employees’ side (Eurofound, 1999). Then, the MNE chooses 
whether to negotiate by means of headquarter agents or subsidiaries’ management. Finally, 
according to the parties’ decisions, bargaining takes place simultaneously but independently at each 
productive site. It results that the relative parties’ bargaining power and the scale of transaction 
costs are elements affecting the final bargaining outcomes.  
Respect to the received literature, the novel result of the paper is the following. The added MNE’s 
flexibility about the mode of negotiating as a mean of counter-reacting to the unions’ prospect of 
cross borders coordination, and the presence of transaction costs produce different bargaining 
regimes (full autonomy, partial coordination, full coordination) arising as equilibrium of the game. 
These diversities are present despite the absence of asymmetries in the MNE plants’ efficiency and 
perfect substitutability among workers in production. This in turn implies that, under certain 
circumstances, the conflict of interest among the parties as regards the level of coordination in 
company-wide negotiations  may disappears.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and derives the 
sub-game perfect bargaining regime arising in equilibrium. A further discussion of the results 
compared to the earlier literature is also provided. Finally, section 3 draws some conclusions. 
 
 
                                                 
3 On sequential wage bargaining in oligopoly industries see also De Fraja (1993), Dobson (1994) and Banerji (2002).   4
Figure 1: Timing of the game 
 
Legenda: N stands for  no coordination, C for coordination; the first letter refers to unions, the second to MNE . 
 
2. The model 
 
This section develops a simple three-stage bargaining game model in a multi-unit firm with plants 
sited in different countries of an integrated product market. For the purposes of this paper, it is 
relevant only the fact that the MNE has organizational power at each plant and not the technical 
form used to exerted control (green-field investments, transnational Mergers & Acquisitions, 
private equity funds, etc.).  
There are two symmetric countries, denoted A and B, and in each country a MNE has a plant. The 
MNE produces for the entire market a non-differentiated good having no close substitutes; that is, 
product market competition does not occur. It is assumed that there are some exogenous fix costs 
G , large enough that neither the MNE will set up a new production facility, nor a potential entrant 
will enter into the industry. Moreover, each plant has a capacity constraint such that if the MNE 
shutdowns one plant, the other plant cannot produce the monopoly output for the entire market. The 
production of the MNE may be eventually exported across countries without extra transportation 
costs. The two plants have identical technology, and labor is the unique factor of production, with 
decreasing returns to scale. Labor supply is supposed to be sufficiently large to avoid corner 
solutions. The MNE hires workers at each plant from a rent-maximizing labor union that operates 
there, and workers are fully unionized.  
As Figure 1 shows, the game follows this timing. In the first stage, unions decide whether to 
coordinate wage bargaining at transnational level. In the second stage, the MNE chooses whether 
negotiations with unions will be conducted autonomously by the management of each subsidiary or 
coordinated by general management. In the last stage, wage negotiations between unions and the 
MNE take place. These are modelled with the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The wage 
setting occurs before employment decisions are made. Thus, the MNE hires workers according to 
its necessities (right-to-manage approach). Given the bargained wages the MNE allocates 
production among plants. The model is solved in the usual backward fashion to get sub-game 
perfect equilibria.  
In each plant, the production function ( i q ) presents decreasing returns to scale in the single input, 
labor ( i l )  
 
i i l q = ,  B A i , =                 ( 1 )  
 
while the (inverse) linear product demand function is given by  
 
Q a p − =                                                                                                    (2) 
 
where  p  is the common price for the integrated market, and  ∑ =
i
i q Q  is total output.    5
The union utility is given by the following Stone-Geary utility function 
 
(1 ) ii i wl Ω= − ,  B A i , =                                                                                  (3) 
 
where each union assigns equal weight to wage and employment in its preferences (neutrally 
oriented union), while the reservation wage is equal across countries and fixed for analytical 
convenience at the unity.  
 
2.1 Last stage: optimal allocation of production among MNE’s plants  
 
The MNE maximizes profits by choosing the total quantity for the integrated market. The optimal 
allocation between the two plants is determined according to respective costs. From (1) it is 
obtained that at each plant, given wages, total and marginal costs are respectively   
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i i i q w TC = ;  i i i q w MC 2 = ;  
 













Total and marginal revenue are 
 
() Q Q a TR − =  ;  Q a MR 2 − = . 
 
Standard optimization techniques (for details see Borghijs and Du Caju, 1999) yield the following 
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  j i B A j i ≠ = ; , ,                 ( 5 )
            
with  0 < ∂ ∂ i i w q ,  0 < ∂ ∂ i i w l ,  0 > ∂ ∂ j i w q  and  0 > ∂ ∂ j i w l , that is, each plant’s output and 
employment is negatively dependent on its wage level and positively related to the wage rate in the 
other plant. This means that workers in each plant are put in competition in the labor market against 
workers at the other plant. Notice also that  i j j i w w q q = : the necessary condition of equalization 
of the marginal costs of production across plants is satisfied. Hence, given the MNE global 
production, total cost is minimized, and consequently MNE profits are maximized. 
Finally, subsidiary i’s profits can be written as  ii i i pqw l π = − . Making use of (2), (4) and (5), it can 
be shown that these equal  














whit  0 ii w π ∂∂ <  and  0 ij w π ∂∂> , as expected: an increase in the subsidiary i’s bargained wage 
decreases its profits, while an increase in the subsidiary j’s wage increases the subsidiary i’s profits. 
 
2.2 Unions do not coordinate 
 
At the first stage of the game, unions decide whether to coordinate bargaining. Subsequently, the 
MNE chooses whether negotiations will be handled autonomously by the management of each 
subsidiary, or coordinated by general management. First, let us consider the case that unions do not 
coordinate. Depending on the MNE choice about the negotiations’ conduction, two cases arise.  
 
2.2.1 Full autonomy   
  
Suppose that the MNE chooses of conducing negotiations with subsidiaries’ management (the case 
denoted by NN in Figure 1). Under the NN regime, the wage rate at each subsidiary is determined 
by maximizing the following Nash Product 
 
{ }






− == Ω   B A i , =                           (6) 
 
where ) 1 ; 0 ( ∈ α  is the exogenous relative bargaining power of the union, assumed to be symmetric 
across plants. In case of breakdown of negotiations, the inside option of both parties equals zero. 
Similarly to Horn and Wolinsky (1988), in this case each MNE’s subsidiary is in a bilateral 
monopoly relation with the local labor union. Therefore, the wage rate at subsidiary j affects union 
i’s objective function only due to its indirect effect on  i l .  
The first order condition for wage maximization is  
 
[] (1 ) ( 1 ) (1 )
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   ∂∂
+− = − − −   ∂∂   
     B A i , = .           ( 7 )  
 
Given symmetry, the equilibrium wage under NN is derived  
 
2 11 ( 1 ) NN w α αα  =+ + +− −

.                    ( 8 )  
 
The term in brackets represents the rent over the reservation wage. As expected,  0 NN w α ∂∂ > : 
higher bargaining power of the union increases the equilibrium wage because unions capture a 
higher share of the MNE’s rents. Replacing (8) into (5), the following labor demand in equilibrium 
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whit  , 0 iN N l α ∂∂ < . Further substitutions in to the relevant expressions allow to compute the MNE 
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2.2.2 MNE headquarter coordination in bargaining   
 
Assume now that the MNE participates in negotiations with headquarter representatives. One may 
imagine of a situation where the MNE sends to each subsidiary one agent representing the total 
interests of the firm (Zhao, 1995). Since the cost of sending agents may be realistically supposed 
negligible respect to the total profit amount, it is assumed that the MNE does not sustain any costs 
to coordinate bargaining activities. Negotiations occur separately but simultaneously at each plant 
(the NC case in Figure 1). In such regime, the wage rate for the ith subsidiary is determined by 
maximizing the following  expression 
 
{ }
*1 argmax ( ) ( )
i








j π  is the MNE’s inside option in case of breakdown of negotiations. The union i’s inside 
option equals zero. The MNE’s disagreement utility might have different specifications. In the 
present context, 
*
j π  (alternatively seen as lock-out funds) could be defined either as subsidiary j’s 
profits at the anticipated full autonomous bargaining equilibrium output, or as the MNE profits 
when subsidiary j operates as the unique plant producing for the whole market. Nevertheless, given 
the assumption of capacity constraint at each plant, the latter possibility is ruled out.  
The first order condition for wage maximization is given by  
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because in equilibrium 
*
jj π π =  and 
* 0 ji w π ∂∂ = . Given the symmetry assumption, equilibrium 
wages are   
 






 ++ − −
=+ 
+  
,             ( 1 2 )  
 
where the term in brackets is the rent over the reservation wage, with  0 NC w α ∂ ∂>. Nevertheless, 
comparing equations (8) and (12), it turns out that  (0;1) NC NN wwα >∀ ∈. The rationale for this 
result may be found by inspection of the first order conditions in equations (7) and (11). In the NN 
regime, each subsidiary management takes into account only the negative effect of the negotiated 
wage during the bargaining on its subsidiary profit (the term  ii w π ∂ ∂ ). Instead, in the NC 
bargaining regime the MNE’s headquarter agents internalize also the positive effect of the wage 
increase at the other subsidiary (the term  ji w π ∂ ∂ ). This implies that the subsidiary i’s position is 
weaker during negotiations while, by recognizing this internalization effect by MNE headquarter   8
agents, the bargaining position of each union at the respective plant improves. As a result, 
negotiations lead to higher wage rates.  
Putting the expression in (12) into (5), it is derived that the subsidiary i’s labor demand in 
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whit  , 0 iN C l α ∂∂ < . By comparison of equations (9) and (13), it results that  ,, (0;1) iN N iN C llα >∀ ∈: 
higher bargained wages in the NC regime shrink the labor demand at each site for the MNE.  
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2.3 Unions  coordinate   
 
Suppose now that unions coordinate at transnational level bargaining activities. Given the MNE 
range of possibilities as regards the selection of the bargaining mode, two cases arise.  
 
2.3.1  Unions’  coordination only  
 
First, assume that the MNE decides of participating in negotiations with subsidiaries’ management. 
Bargaining takes place autonomously but simultaneously at each subsidiary (the CN case in Figure 
1). To share information in coordinating activities, unions are supposed to incur an exogenous per 
union member (symmetric) transaction cost  0 ≥ τ . The total amount of this cost, given by  i l τ  with 
, iA B = , must be deducted from the unions’ rent in case of separate bargaining (Borghijs and Du 
Caju, 1999). A decrease in unions’ transaction costs is the measure of the degree of labor market 
integration. In the CN bargaining regime, the wage for the ith subsidiary is determined by the 
maximization of the following Nash product 
 
{ }
1 argmax ( 1) ( 1) ( )
i
ii i i j j i i
w
wN P w l w l D
α α ττ π
−  == − − + − − −       j i B A j i ≠ = ; , ,    (14) 
 
where  i D  is the union i’s inside option in case of breakdown of negotiations. The MNE subsidiary 
i’s inside option in absence of coordination equals zero. The disagreement utility of the union may 
have different specifications (Horn and Wolinsky 1988; Dobson, 1994; Santoni, 2009; Mukherjee, 
2010). In the present context,  i D  (alternatively seen as strike funds) might be defined either as the 
utility that the coordinated union obtains at subsidiary j at the anticipated separate bargaining 
equilibrium output, or as the union utility when subsidiary j operates as a monopolist with a unique 
plant producing for the entire market. However, the initial assumption of capacity constraint at each 
plant rules out the latter possibility.  
The first order condition for wage maximization is given by   
   9
( 1) ( 1) (1 ) ( 1)
j i i
ii i j i i j
ii i
l l
lw w wl l
ww w
π
απ τ τ α τ τ
∂    ∂∂  +− − +− − = − −− − −    ∂∂ ∂   
  j i B A j i ≠ = ; , , 
             ( 1 5 )  
 
because ( 1) ij j Dw l =− in equilibrium. Comparing the first order conditions in (7) and (15), it 
results that the difference among non-coordinated/coordinated unions stands in the fact that in the 
latter case labor unions consider not only the effect of  i w  on  i l , but also the effect of their own 
wage on the labor demand at the other plant. That is, unions internalize the cross effects of an 
increase in their wage rates on overall employment levels (Davidson, 1988; Horn and Wolinsky, 
1988). Since in the present context workers at each plant are perfect substitutes in the production 
activity among them, an increase in subsidiary i’s wage rate raises the labor demand at subsidiary j 
(and vice versa): that is,  0 ji lw ∂∂> . Hence, the bargaining coordination across plants for labor 
unions in principle should be more profitable respect to non-coordinated bargaining. Nevertheless, 
the presence of transaction costs may offset the unions’ gains. Whether coordination is 
advantageous for unions crucially depend on the size of these costs. 
Given the symmetry, from (15) it is obtained that equilibrium wages are   
 
22 14( 2 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 1 ) CN w ατ α τ α τ  =+ + − + + + +−

.                  (16) 
 
The term in brackets represents the union rent. Analytical inspection reveals that  0 CN w α ∂∂ >  as 
expected, and  0 CN w τ ∂∂ > : that is, an increase in transaction costs for coordinating activities is 
passed through higher wage claims by unions during negotiations at each plant. Replacing the wage 
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whit  , 0 iC N l α ∂∂ <  and  , 0 iC N l τ ∂ ∂<. This is so because both higher unions’ relative bargaining 
power and transaction costs increase the bargained wage, and this in turn implies a reduction in the 
labor demand at each site for the MNE (the wage/employment trade-off). Subsequent substitutions 
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2.3.2 Full coordination 
 
Finally, suppose that both the MNE and the labor unions choose of conducing negotiations by 
coordinating their bargaining activities. Negotiations take place independently and simultaneously   10
at the two MNE subsidiaries (the CC case in Figure 1). As before, labor unions incur in exogenous 
per member coordination costs while the MNE does not. In the CC bargaining regime, the wage rate 
for the ith subsidiary is determined by maximizing the following Nash product 
 
{ }
1 argmax ( 1) ( 1) ( )
i
ii i i j j i j
w
wN P w l w l
α α ττ π π
−  == − − + − − +       j i B A j i ≠ = ; , , .   (18) 
 
In case of breakdown of negotiations, the two parties’ inside option now equals zero.  
The first order condition for wage maximization is  
 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) (1 ) ( 1) ( 1)
j j i i
ij i i j i i j j
ii ii
l l
lw w wl wl
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π π
απ π τ τ α τ τ
∂∂    ∂∂  + + −−+ −− = −− −− + −− +    ∂∂ ∂ ∂   
 
              j i B A j i ≠ = ; , ,  .  (19) 
 
Given the symmetry, it is obtained that in equilibrium the wage rates are  
 
[ ] 1( 3 ( 1 ) CC w α τα =+ + +                         ( 2 0 )  
 
where the term in brackets is the union rent over reservation wage, whit  0 CC w α ∂∂ >  and 
0 CC w τ ∂∂ > . Substituting back the wage rate in (20) into (5), the following labor demand at 
subsidiary i is obtained in equilibrium 
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=  ++ 
             ( 2 1 )  
 
whit  , 0 iC C l α ∂∂ <  and  , 0 iC C l τ ∂∂ < . By comparison of equations (16) and (20), and equations (17) 
and (21), it results that  CN CC ww ≥  and  ,, iC C iC N ll ≥  if and only if transaction costs are above a certain 
threshold level, namely 
2 15 4 ( 1 ) 1 ττ α α α
∗  ≥= ++ +−

. In such a case, the MNE recovers 
bargaining position by effect of coordination when it is opposed to coordinated unions because it 
reduces their inside option from  i D  to zero. This coordination effect overcomes both the cross 
effects of employment and the internalization of profit externalities (see equations (19), (15) and 
(11)), therefore leading to lower negotiated wages and higher employment levels. On the contrary, 
if τ τ
∗ < , it follows that  CC CN ww >  and  ,, iC N iC C ll > : despite unions’ inside option falls to zero, the 
coordination advantages for the MNE are not sufficient to dominate the internalization of 
employment and profits externalities. Thus, full coordination leads to higher negotiated wages.  
This finding in part reverses the MNE’s position when facing non-coordinated unions. In that case, 
the MNE has no incentives in negotiating wages with headquarters agents, since the internalization 
of subsidiary profit externalities put unions in a stronger bargaining position. This is corroborated 
by comparison of equations (12), (16) and (20): it can be verified that for sufficiently low values of 
unions’ bargaining power and transaction cost levels it may be either the case that  NC CC CN www >> 
or  CC NC CN www >>. 
Finally, further substitutions allow to evaluate the expressions for the MNE profits and global union 
utility, represented by  
   11
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2.5 Second stage: the MNE’s choice of coordinated (headquarter agents) vs. separated 
(subsidiaries’ management) bargaining  
 
In the second stage of the game, the MNE selects the way of conducing its negotiations. The choice 
depends on the global profits that will be attained by the company under the no 
coordinated/coordinated bargaining decision of the unions. Profit levels are affected by the relative 
parties’ bargaining power, α , and the unions’ per member transaction cost, τ . Headquarter 
coordination turns out to be advantageous for the MNE if  NC NN π π ≥  when unions do not coordinate 
bargaining, and if  CC CN π π ≥  in case of unions’ transnational coordination. From direct payoffs’ 
comparison, the following proposition may be established. 
 
Proposition 1: 1) If unions do not coordinate bargaining activities, full autonomy always  Pareto-
dominates headquarter coordination for the MNE: that is,  (0;1) NN NC π πα ≥∀ ∈ ;   
2) if unions coordinate bargaining activities, MNE headquarter coordination Pareto-dominates the 
subsidiaries’ negotiations when transaction costs are larger than the threshold value: that is, 
CC CN iif π πτ τ
∗ ≥≥ .  
 
Proposition 1 states that a MNE will never find beneficial to coordinate negotiations whenever 
unions act separately, and the rational was find in the fact that the internalization of subsidiaries’ 
profits by headquarter agents makes autonomous unions stronger.  
Instead, the MNE may find profitable coordination among subsidiaries as a mean to counterbalance 
bargaining positions only if unions are coordinating negotiations, and transaction costs are 
relatively high. In other words, under these circumstances, to negotiate with headquarter agents is a 
beneficial strategy to counter react unions’ bargaining coordination. In particular, the threshold 
value  τ
∗ depends on the parties’ bargaining power, with  0 τα
∗ ∂ ∂>: an increase in unions’ 
strength makes the threshold for coordination higher. Thus, negotiations with headquarter agents are 
more likely to occur when labor unions are weak and their coordination incentives higher.  
 
2.6 First stage: the unions’ decision and sub-game equilibria  
 
In the first stage of the game, the unions choose whether to coordinate bargaining. Due to the 
backward induction procedure and given the timing of the game, in making such a decision unions 
take as given the strategic choice made by the MNE about its preferred way of conducing 
negotiations. As a consequence, in selecting the strategy (coordination/no coordination), unions 
compare their relevant payoffs subject to the MNE bargaining coordination choice. The analysis 
below shows how this will affect the unions’ choice and derives the sub-game perfect bargaining 
regime arising in equilibrium. Figure 2 shows the results in the ) , ( τ α -space. 
If unions do not coordinate bargaining, they know that the MNE will never participate in 
negotiations with headquarter agents. Unions get their highest utility level under the NC regime, but 
given the strategic choice of the MNE, this outcome will never be reached. Negotiations take place 
only under the NN regime. If unions coordinate their activities, the MNE bargains with headquarter 
agents if  τ τ
∗ ≥ , while for τ τ
∗ <  it negotiates by subsidiaries management. Therefore, depending 
on the transaction cost level, either the CN or the CC regime arise as equilibrium of the game. Thus, 
unions decide their strategy comparing the following payoffs:  CC Ω ,  CN Ω ,  NN Ω . This generates four 
different regions.   12




In region I, delimited by  ( ) τ α
∗  and the threshold value 
**() τ α  (whose analytical expression is 
rather complex and it is not reported), unions’ payoffs under bargaining coordination are larger than 
under full autonomous bargaining. However, given that for τ τ
∗ <  transaction cost levels are such 
that the MNE will not coordinate negotiations across plants, the CN regime arises in equilibrium. It 
can be checked that this is a third best outcome for both parties. 
Region II is characterized by relative high values of unions’ bargaining power and transaction costs 
**() τ τα ≥ , such that unions do not find profitable to coordinate their bargaining activities. Since 
the MNE never negotiates with headquarter agents when unions act separately, the NN regime 
arises as equilibrium. Direct payoffs’ comparison shows that in this region the MNE reaches its first 
best, while unions get a second best outcome. 
In region III, restricted by  ( ) τ α
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configuration of the parameters  ) , ( τ α  is such that for the MNE is advantageous to coordinate 
bargaining with headquarter agents, while for unions coordinated negotiations ensure payoffs 
superior than autonomous negotiations. Hence, given the choice of the MNE in the previous stage 
of the game, in this region the CC bargaining regime arises as equilibrium. Comparing the payoffs, 
it can be verified that this is a third best outcome for both bargaining parties. 
Finally, in region IV, delimited by 
**() τ α  and 
***() τ α , if unions coordinate, their relative 
bargaining power and the scale of transaction costs are such that the MNE chooses to coordinate 
negotiations among subsidiaries. However, from payoffs’ evaluation it is obtained that unions are 
better off if they bargain in full autonomy, that is,  NN CC Ω ≥Ω . In other words, autonomous 
negotiations Pareto-dominate bargaining coordination for unions, and straightforward comparison 
shows that they get a third best outcome. Since  NN π  is the MNE’s first best outcome, it turns out 
that the NN bargaining regime arises as sub-game perfect equilibrium in this region.  
 
2.7 Discussion of the results  
 
These findings complement those obtained in the collective bargaining literature. The received 
literature has shown that the endogenous bargaining structures (decentralized/centralized) arising in 
equilibrium in oligopoly industries crucially depend on the nature of product markets 
(complement/substitute goods). If input suppliers, notably unions, are first movers it turns out that   13
in presence of complement goods independent negotiations with firms arise as equilibrium, while 
with substitute goods coordinated unions get higher payoffs. If firms also centralize bargaining, 
their preference order is reversed. That is, unions and firms have conflict of interests over the level 
of coordination (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988).  
Instead, Santoni (2009) analyzes how increasing international market integration (a reduction in 
trade costs allowing for a higher import penetration by a foreign firm) will affect the choice related 
to decentralized/centralized negotiations in presence of fixed transaction costs for both parties in a 
national oligopoly industry. When unions and firms simultaneously choose their 
centralized/decentralized bargaining strategy, this author shows that if the goods are substitutes 
decentralization is a dominant strategy for firms, while each union, depending on the parameters of 
the model, will choose either centralization or decentralization. Therefore, either full 
decentralization or unions’ partial centralization arise as sub-game perfect equilibria. On the other 
hand, if the goods are complements, decentralization is a dominant strategy for unions, while firms 
will either select centralization or decentralization. Thus, either full decentralization or firms’ partial 
centralization arise as sub-game perfect equilibria of the game. Which of these bargaining regimes 
is more likely to arise as unique sub-game equilibrium depends on the characteristics of product 
market integration process’ (one-way or two-way trade among countries). However, it is worth 
noting that full centralization in this model never arises as equilibrium of the game. On the other 
hand, abstracting from the complementary/substitutability issue, Petrakis and Vlassis (2004) show 
that in presence of asymmetries in firms’ productive efficiency, the intervention of a national 
regulator intervention establishing a minimum wage floor leads to full centralization, partial 
centralization and full decentralization as bargaining regime  arising in equilibrium. Wage 
formation at company level in a context of international productive structure is explored by 
Borghijs and Du Caju (1999). The authors’ analysis is based on the assumption of monopoly unions 
having full bargaining power and fixing unilaterally wage rates, and it investigates the possibility of 
cross borders union cooperation opposed to plant specific wage settings. Depending on the scale of 
transaction costs, the two extreme cases of transnational wage coordination and separate wage 
settings arise in equilibrium. 
Focussing the analysis at company level as Borghijs and Du Caju (1999), and leaving a 
simultaneous move game framework for a sequential one, the present work shows that in a context 
where workers are perfect substitutes in production (therefore, in absence of efficiency asymmetries 
among plants), if the MNE has an added flexibility of counter-reacting to unions’ bargaining 
coordination decision, full centralization, partial union centralization and full decentralization arise 
as bargaining regime in equilibrium. Moreover, under specific circumstances, the presence of 
coordination costs makes advantageous for unions to negotiate wages independently, attenuating the 
conflict of interests with the MNE over the level of bargaining coordination at which negotiations 
inside the company should take place.   
The proposed framework may help to shed lights on the variety of bargaining coordination activities 
actually observed within the MNE operating in the EU. The fact that unions’ transnational 
bargaining activities are recently increasing may suggest that coordination costs are decreasing 
(labor markets turn out to be more integrated), and at least in those companies having plants located 
in countries with similar labor productivity these practices are more likely to occur. Further 
developments in the normative framework proposed by the EU institutions as regards information 
and consultation rights for MNE’ employees to transnational issues, by affecting the scale of   





This paper develops a three-stage game to investigate bargaining coordination at company level 
among a MNE with production facilities in different countries and plant level unionized workforce.   14
Unions first decide whether to coordinate their bargaining activities; then, on the basis of the 
unions’ choice, the MNE selects whether negotiations will be conducted by subsidiaries’ 
management or headquarter agents. Finally, wage negotiations take place, and given the bargained 
wages, the MNE determines the optimal allocation of production among plants. The main point of 
the paper is the following. With workers perfect substitutes in production, absence of asymmetries 
among the MNE’s plants, and labor unions paying transaction costs to coordinate their activities at 
transnational level, different bargaining regimes arise as sub-game perfect equilibria. Depending on 
the scale of unions’ transaction costs and the parties’ relative bargaining power, full coordination, 
partial unions’ coordination and full autonomous bargaining are given in equilibrium. Therefore, the 
presence of relatively high per union member transaction costs does not make always beneficial 
bargaining coordination for unionized workforce. This in part moderates the conflict of interests 
between the MNE and labor unions over the level of coordination during negotiations.  
Nonetheless, the results of this work are restricted to the case of a MNE in a monopoly position in 
the product market. A more realistic framework should investigate an international oligopoly 
market structure analyzing the effects of firms’ strategic interactions on the unions/MNEs 
coordination choice in bargaining activities. Additionally, differences in labor unions’ transaction 
costs across companies and in labor productivity among plants may influence the final negotiations’ 
regime; that is, the coordination activities taking place within a company will not necessarily arise 
in another one. These represent further extensions of the model which may help to understand the 
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